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Structuring the Rule of Reason: The 
Supreme Court Opens the Door for Both 
Robin Feldman* 
In a wonderfully crisp manner, Justice Breyer’s majority 
opinion in the recent case of FTC v. Actavis, Inc. sets out the 
issue in the case: 
[T]wo companies settle under terms that require . . . the claimed 
infringer[ ] not to produce the patented product until the patent’s 
term expires, and . . . the patentee[ ] to pay [the infringer] many 
millions of dollars. Because the settlement requires the patentee to 
pay the alleged infringer, rather than the other way around, this 
kind of settlement agreement is often called a “reverse payment” 
settlement agreement. And the basic question here is whether such 
an agreement can sometimes unreasonably diminish competition 
in violation of the antitrust laws.1 
The simplicity of the description is particularly impressive 
given that very little in the context of patent litigation between 
generic and branded pharmaceutical companies is crisp or 
clear. 
The litigation and regulatory system for launching generic 
drugs is called Hatch-Waxman,2 after the legislation that 
spawned its web-like complexity.3 And herein lies the problem; 
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 1. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013). 
 2. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-
Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.). 
 3. For a detailed description of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the 
machinations it has engendered, see C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: 
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1553, 1578–79 (2006) (describing the 180-day exclusivity duopoly that 
can be granted to generic firms under the Act); Matthew Avery, Note, 
Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical Patent Holders 
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the complexity of Hatch-Waxman has provided opportunities 
for patent manipulation. These opportunities appear against a 
backdrop of the patent system in general, in which 
manipulation of the patent system has been elevated to an art 
form.4 
The difference between our aspirations for the patent 
system and what we are currently experiencing can be summed 
up as the difference between deploying the legal right and 
deploying the legal system. Some patent holders, both within 
the Hatch-Waxman context and in other circumstances, are 
taking advantage of weaknesses in the litigation system to 
extract value that is unrelated to any value that the patents 
might contribute to a product.5 It is a singularly unproductive 
use of a government-granted right—a right that, ironically, is 
intended to enhance productivity. As Rob Merges noted in a 
recent article on litigation abuses in patent trolling: “As a way 
of resolving disputes over the transfer of assets or legal rights, 
litigation makes sense. As the basis of productive economic 
activity, not so much.”6 
A patent gives one an opportunity to exploit an idea. It is 
not intended as a universal pass for exploiting the legal system. 
Nevertheless, an inappropriate notion that I would call patent 
exceptionalism has been allowing patent holders, all too 
frequently, to exercise free rein. Patent exceptionalism, this 
devotion to an artificial image of patents, is distorting the 
                                                          
and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 173 (2008) 
(giving an overview of how the 2003 amendments modified the Act). 
 4. See, e.g., Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 (“The patent world is quietly undergoing a change of 
seismic proportions.”); Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. 
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 250 (2013) [hereinafter Feldman, Intellectual Property 
Wrongs]; Carl Shapiro & Fiona Scott Morton, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 
A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 1), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2288911 (describing the 
increasing popularity of “strategic patent acquisitions”). 
 5. See Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, supra note 4 (describing 
inappropriate rent-seeking activity with intellectual property rights in 
general); see also ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 158–78 (2012) 
[hereinafter FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW] (describing patent 
manipulations in the pharmaceutical industry in both the Hatch-Waxman and 
other contexts). 
 6. See Robert Merges, Some Common Sense About Innovation and Patent 
Litigation, MEDIA INST. (July 22, 2013), http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/
2013/072213.php. 
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patent system, as well as the other legal domains with which it 
must interact. 
The patent system is not a deity to which we must 
respectfully defer. It is a living, breathing part of the organism 
that is our legal system. If we continue to treat patents with 
exceptionalism, we have only ourselves to blame as we walk 
willingly into the volcano. 
Part I of this Article describes Hatch-Waxman and the 
questions that arise in reverse payment settlements between 
branded and generic pharmaceutical companies. Part II 
describes patent exceptionalism and explains how the Supreme 
Court decision in Actavis moves away from it. This part also 
highlights where exceptionalism imagery continues to lurk 
within some of the Justices’ language, both in the majority and 
dissenting opinions. 
Part III moves beyond patent exceptionalism and explains 
how the appeal of patent execptionalism is intertwined with 
problems in the antitrust system. To put it bluntly, patent 
exceptionalism is alluring because it makes life so simple. 
Moving away from patent exceptionalism means that we have 
to worry about the messy question of what is acceptable and 
what is not acceptable patent behavior. 
In the antitrust arena, this question is generally addressed 
through the rule of reason, and there is nothing messier than 
the rule of reason—at least in its pure form. As I have noted in 
the past, the rule of reason analysis is so complex that it is a 
burden on litigants and the judicial system.7 Once again, the 
Supreme Court language in Actavis opens the door for moving 
away from this problem, although one could argue that the 
door was opened merely a crack. Specifically, by directing the 
lower courts to “structure” antitrust litigation,8 the Court 
provided an opportunity to give form to the amorphous rule of 
reason, an apparition that has repelled the hardiest of 
antitrust warriors. Part III of this Article will discuss the 
notion of a structured rule of reason and how it might give form 
to the inquiry. 
                                                          
 7. Robin Cooper Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO. 
L.J. 2079, 2107–08 (1999) [hereinafter Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in 
Antitrust] (citing various sources showing the difficulty of applying the rule of 
reason). 
 8. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013). 
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I. PAY-FOR-DELAY 
A. HATCH-WAXMAN 
Approved in 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Act (the Act) was 
designed to reduce the price of medicines by bringing generic 
drugs to market as quickly as possible.9 Studies show that the 
price of medication drops by 20%–30% when one generic enters 
the market and can fall as much as 80% or more when multiple 
generics enter and saturate the market.10 
Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic companies could 
not begin working on approval and production of a medicine 
until the expiration of the branded drug’s patent.11 This 
allowed continuation of the branded drug’s market power 
beyond the life of the patent.12 Among other things, the Act 
provided a mechanism for the generic drug maker to begin the 
approval process ahead of time so that the generic drug would 
be ready for launch at the expiration of the patent.13 
The Act’s attempts to encourage generic entry go well 
beyond lining up for entry. In particular, the Act allows generic 
companies to piggy-back on the extensive studies required for 
FDA approval of a drug.14 Rather than repeating the lengthy 
and expensive drug trials required for a new drug, generic 
companies can use the data from the original studies and focus 
on demonstrating that the generic version has the same active 
ingredients and is biologically equivalent to the original drug.15 
                                                          
 9. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (stating the purpose of the Act was 
to “make available more low cost generic drugs”). 
 10. See, e.g., Jessie Cheng, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in 
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1476 n.30 (2008); 
Benjamin G. Druss et al., Listening to Generic Prozac: Winners, Losers, and 
Sideliners, 23 HEALTH AFF. 210, 214 (2004); see also Answer, Affirmative 
Defenses, and Counterclaims at 23, Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Sandoz 
Inc., No. 2:08-CV-3710-PAC (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2008), 2008 WL 4486682; 
Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price 
Competition in Pharmaceuticals After the 1984 Drug Act, 35 J.L. & ECON. 331, 
335–36 (1992). 
 11. See Avery, supra note 3, at 174–75. 
 12. Id. at 175. 
 13. Id. at 176. 
 14. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012) (providing for abbreviated new drug 
applications (ANDAs)). 
 15. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 
(citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv)). 
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The Act also includes an incentive for companies to step up 
to the plate, bring forth generic versions, and challenge the 
branded behemoths—and, in fact, there has been some 
grumbling that Hatch-Waxman tilts too far in favor of generics 
in various aspects. Specifically, the first generic to file for 
approval under the Hatch-Waxman system and get the drug to 
market will receive a six-month exclusivity period.16 In other 
words, no other generic can come to market during that period. 
This has the effect of ensuring that the price will stay higher 
for the branded drug company and for the single generic during 
this period than when all generics are eventually allowed in 
after six months. The six-month exclusivity period can be worth 
as much as hundreds of millions of dollars to a generic 
company.17 
The Hatch-Waxman Act also contains a procedure for 
resolving potential patent disputes between the generic and the 
branded drug companies. Among other options, a generic 
company can assert that the patents covering the drug are 
either invalid or do not apply to the generic version.18 The 
branded drug company can then bring an infringement suit, 
which stops the FDA approval process for thirty months while 
the parties litigate.19 
B. WHY PAY FOR DELAY? 
The end of the life of a patent can be a traumatic time for 
the maker of a blockbuster drug, and as with many end-of-life 
decisions, it can produce a flurry of activity to extend the 
company’s life blood—its prominence in the market—for as 
long as possible. Pay-for-delay settlements are one of a variety 
of approaches pharmaceutical companies have developed that 
have the effect of delaying the inevitable and holding onto the 
stream of supercharged prices a little longer.20 
                                                          
 16. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 17. Hemphill, supra note 3, at 1579. 
 18. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). Such challenges are referred to as 
Paragraph IV challenges, “which occur when a generic manufacturer seeks 
FDA approval to make a generic equivalent of a pioneer’s drug before its 
patent term has expired.” Avery, supra note 3, at 177. 
 19. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 20. For a description of other approaches, see FELDMAN, RETHINKING 
PATENT LAW, supra note 5, at 158–78. 
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Imagine if a branded company pays the generic company to 
stay off the market beyond the expiration of the patent term. 
Given that Hatch-Waxman prevents additional generics from 
coming to market until six months after the first generic gets to 
market, whenever that may be, the agreement could have the 
effect of keeping all generic companies off the market beyond 
the expiration of the patent term. This arrangement could raise 
concerns about anticompetitive behavior. The end of the patent 
should bring competition and drive prices down, but the 
branded company has delayed that day of reckoning. In essence 
the branded company, knowing that prices will stay at a 
supracompetitive level, may be sharing some of those monopoly 
rents with the generic company, with the two agreeing to keep 
competition out of the market. The loser, of course, would be 
the consumer who continues to pay inappropriately high drug 
prices—although increasingly, the losers are also the insurance 
companies and government entities that pay those prices. 
The settlement in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. is more subtle. 
There, the branded company paid the generic, and the generic 
agreed to drop its patent challenge but to stay off the market 
only until a time before the expiration of the patent—sixty-five 
months before the expiration of the patent.21 This brings the 
issues into stark relief. On the one hand, the branded company 
can argue that the settlement is a rational calculation of the 
costs and risks of litigation that a company may incur even if 
the patent is perfectly valid and validly applies to the generic 
drug. On the other hand, one could argue that a reverse 
payment of this kind is much like the classic reverse payment 
settlement described above. Although the life of a patent that is 
valid and validly applied may have been sixty-five months 
more, the life of a patent that is invalid or invalidly applied is 
zero. Thus, an Actavis-style settlement could be an 
inappropriate use of a patent in an anticompetitive manner. 
Overshadowing all of this, we have patent exceptionalism, 
which has been applied to prevent the courts from even 
considering these issues. 
II. PATENT EXCEPTIONALISM 
The clash between patent law and antitrust law is often 
portrayed as a battle of the Titans, with antitrust law 
                                                          
 21. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013). 
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abhorring monopoly and patent law championing it. One 
version of the narrative is something like the following: Patents 
confer a monopoly; anticompetitive though this may be, it is the 
life we have chosen for our patent system. Thus, when a patent 
is at play, antitrust should yield, and the government should 
keep its nose out. Following this line of reasoning, some courts 
have been willing to say, as the Eleventh Circuit did in this 
case, that given a patent holder’s lawful right to exclude others 
from the market, a patent “conveys the right to cripple 
competition.”22 The dissenters in Actavis articulated the issue 
in simple, stark terms: “A patent carves out an exception to the 
applicability of antitrust laws.”23 Or, as Chief Justice Roberts 
noted: “[A] patent holder acting within the scope of its patent 
has an obvious defense to any antitrust suit: that its patent 
allows it to engage in conduct that would otherwise violate the 
antitrust laws . . . . [T]hat’s the whole point of a patent: to 
confer a limited monopoly.”24 
The problem with this approach is that it fails to 
distinguish between deploying the right and deploying the 
system. If a patent is valid and if it is being validly asserted 
against an infringer, the patent holder may be deploying the 
right. There is no guarantee, however, that those things are 
true. If they are not, the patent holder may simply be using the 
system to extract value or gain an advantage beyond the value 
of the patent. If one shuts off any inquiry the moment a patent 
appears, one loses the opportunity to ask whether the behavior 
involves deploying the patent system, rather than deploying 
the patent. This is a danger of patent exceptionalism. 
The majority opinion recognized this when it noted the 
following: “Solvay’s patent, if valid and infringed, might have 
permitted it to charge drug prices sufficient to recoup the 
reverse settlement payments it agreed to make to its potential 
generic competitors . . . . But we do not agree that that fact, or 
characterization, can immunize the agreement from antitrust 
attack.”25 
                                                          
 22. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. 
Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 23. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 24. Id. at 2240. 
 25. Id. at 2230 (majority opinion). 
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To some extent, patent exceptionalism flows from a 
distorted view of what a patent actually is. The notion of 
exclusion in patent law is quite different from the notion of 
exclusion in antitrust law, or in popular discourse.26 In 
antitrust law, exclusion—as in exclusion of rivals—connotes an 
image of occupying a competitive sphere to prevent the 
incursion of rivals. The patent notion of exclusion is far more 
subtle. Despite much sloppy language from courts and 
commentators, a patent does not grant an exclusive right to 
make, use, or sell a product.27 In fact, a patent does not grant 
the right to do anything at all. A patent merely grants the right 
to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention, 
but others may have overlapping rights to exclude.28 In other 
words, all you get is the right to exclude others from standing 
in the sphere of the invention—as long as they do not have 
their own rights to be standing in that sphere as well.29 
For example, suppose an inventor holds the patent on a 
chemical for making a bright blue dye for candy. Having 
identified a use for the chemical, and if the patent is drafted 
broadly enough, the patent holder can obtain the right to 
exclude anyone from using the dye for any purposes. Suppose, 
however, a medical researcher discovers that the dye is also 
useful for treating spinal cord injuries. The researcher can now 
obtain a patent on the specific use of the dye for treating spinal 
injury.30 At that point, the original inventor has the right to 
exclude everyone from using the dye for any reason. In 
addition, the medical researcher has the right to exclude 
everyone from using the dye for the specific purpose of treating 
injuries. Neither one can operate in the most valuable space—
curing spinal injuries, not selling candy—without obtaining a 
license from the other. Their rights are overlapping, a reality 
that is quite different from what most people imagine when 
                                                          
 26. For an extensive discussion of the ways in which patent and antitrust 
law use the same concepts and terminology with differing meaning and 
contexts, see Robin Feldman, Patent and Antitrust: Differing Shades of 
Meaning, VA. J.L. & TECH., Spring 2008, at 1. 
 27. See, e.g., id. at 8 n.27, 9 n.36. 
 28. See id. at 8. 
 29. See id. at 8–9. 
 30. This hypothetical is based on an actual medical discovery. See 
Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The 
hypothetical and the concepts are described further in FELDMAN, RETHINKING 
PATENT LAW, supra note 5, at 23–35. 
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they think of the patent system. The point is simply that a 
patent does not necessarily grant an “exclusive” right at all. 
The right to exclude is not the same thing as having an 
exclusive right. 
The difference is more than one of semantics. The patent 
system contemplates far less power and control than many 
people assume. Oblivious to this, courts treat patents as 
exceptional creatures, endowing them with a power well 
beyond what is contemplated by the patent system itself. 
In a similar vein, some courts and commentators blithely 
assume that a patent confers a monopoly. That is simply 
untrue. A patent may give its holder the opportunity to try to 
carve out space in the market or to find others interested in 
licensing the patent to do so, but that pursuit rarely succeeds, 
let alone leads to a monopoly.31 Historically, the vast majority 
of patents never create any economic return at all.32 
Translating a patented idea into an actual product usually 
requires the use of multiple patented inventions,33 as well as 
much that is not patented. In the pharmaceutical arena, one 
must be able to translate the patent into a product that is 
stable and can be mass-produced, as well as one that is 
approved by the FDA. In addition, there may be other close 
substitutes or sufficient cross-market elasticities. One might 
hold the patent on aspirin, for example, but still have to 
compete with those who make acetaminophen and ibuprofen. 
The Supreme Court itself has recognized that a patent does not 
necessarily confer a monopoly.34 
In short, a patent is a remarkably limited right, and its 
limited nature reflects the policies inherent in the patent 
system. Despite common misperceptions, the patent system is 
not a monstrous beast, rapacious for the sacrifice of 
competition. 
                                                          
 31. See Feldman, supra note 26, at 4. 
 32. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 75, 75 (2005). 
 33. See id. at 81–82 (“In a number of key industries, . . . companies file 
numerous patent applications on related components that are integrated into 
a single functional product.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 34. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45–56 (2006) 
(holding that a patent by itself is not sufficient to create a presumption of 
market power for the purposes of a tying claim). 
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Even the majority opinion in Actavis subtly falls prey to an 
image of the patent system as single-mindedly anticompetitive. 
For example, the Court notes that “[i]t would be incongruous to 
determine antitrust legality by measuring the settlement’s 
anticompetitive effects solely against patent law policy.”35 
Similarly, at another point the Court describes precedential 
cases that “seek to accommodate patent and antitrust policies, 
finding challenged terms and conditions unlawful unless patent 
law policy offsets the antitrust law policy strongly favoring 
competition.”36 Along the same lines, the dissenting opinion is 
strongly out of focus when it notes that “the whole point of a 
patent [is] to confer a limited monopoly.”37 In contrast to these 
declarations, however, the conflict between patent policy and 
antitrust policy is less stark when one recognizes that the 
patent system contemplates a far weaker and more limited 
vehicle than the sleek, anticompetitive racehorse most people 
have in mind. 
The danger of treating patents as exceptional creatures, for 
which all antitrust inquiry must yield, becomes even greater in 
the context of sham litigation. Current doctrines hamper a 
court’s ability to respond to sham litigation brought by patent 
holders. The problems can be traced to the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine holds that if citizens 
have the right to petition their government, they should be able 
to do so without fear of antitrust liability, even if the results of 
that petition would harm their competitors.38 The original 
doctrine developed to protect citizens who petition legislators to 
enact a law or regulators to enforce a law, but it has been 
expanded to protect citizens who petition the courts by filing a 
lawsuit.39 There is, however, a critical exception. Parties who 
file sham litigation may still be liable for antitrust violations.40 
                                                          
 35. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013). 
 36. Id. at 2233. 
 37. Id. at 2240 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (internal punctuation omitted). 
 38. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 
508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 
U.S. 657 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 
365 U.S. 127 (1961)) (“Those who petition government for redress are 
generally immune from antitrust liability.”). 
 39. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 
(1972). 
 40. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144. 
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Under current doctrine, the standards for showing sham 
litigation are extraordinarily difficult to meet in the case of a 
patent lawsuit. In order to establish that a lawsuit is a sham, 
one must show that the suit is both objectively and subjectively 
baseless.41 With the vast uncertainty involved in interpreting 
the language of any patent, it is remarkably difficult to show 
that any patent lawsuit is both objectively and subjectively 
baseless.42 One can always make an argument in patent law 
that one had some reason to believe someone might construe 
language somewhere in some claim in a way that is favorable. 
Thus, even if a patent holder’s argument is tremendously weak, 
courts are reluctant to find that it constitutes a sham.43 
Worse yet, some courts have suggested that the burden for 
proving sham litigation should be even higher in cases that 
involve patents than in other cases, on the grounds that 
patents are presumptively valid.44 This is a remarkable 
misinterpretation of patent law. It is true that a patent carries 
a presumption of validity, but that has nothing to do with 
whether the assertion of the patent against a particular target 
is valid. The fact that a patent is presumed valid does not 
answer the question of whether the use of that patent is valid 
from an antitrust perspective. 
                                                          
 41. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 57 (“We now . . . hold that 
an objectively reasonable effort to litigate cannot be sham regardless of 
subjective intent.”). For a discussion of the history and requirements of the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine in relation to Hatch-Waxman litigation, see 
FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW, supra note 5, at 164–70; see also 
Matthew Avery et al., The Antitrust Implications of Filing “Sham” Citizen 
Petitions with the FDA, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 113 (2013) (proposing changes to 
FDA regulations and judicial doctrines to avoid problems caused by sham 
petitions). 
 42. FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW, supra note 5, at 168 (“Proving 
sham litigation, however, requires satisfaction of a remarkably high 
burden . . . .”). 
 43. For a troubling example of how difficult this standard is to meet, see 
Robin Feldman, Public Comment on Intellectual Property Assertion & 
Monetization, FTC Patent Assertion Entity Activities Workshop (Mar. 27, 
2013), at 48–56, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/pae/pae-0034.pdf 
(describing the j2 Global patent assertion campaign). 
 44. See, e.g., Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 876 (Fed. Cir. 
1985), overruled on other grounds by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, 
Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon Inc., 601 F.2d 
986, 996 (9th Cir. 1979); Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 
343 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D. Del. 2004). 
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All of these issues must be understood in the context of 
Hatch-Waxman. A significant corner of the Hatch-Waxman 
system is litigation-based. If we combine the complexities of 
Hatch-Waxman (including its potential for manipulation) with 
the rigidity of the sham litigation rules and add in patent 
exceptionalism, we risk granting companies a free pass for 
anticompetitive behavior. The key to disrupting this unholy 
trinity lies in acknowledging the difference between the 
legitimate use of the patent right and the illegitimate use of the 
patent system. 
III. STRUCTURING THE RULE OF REASON 
Patent exceptionalism is a particularly appealing myth 
when faced with the specter of a messy antitrust inquiry. And 
in the world of antitrust, nothing is messier than the rule of 
reason in all its full glory. 
The rule of reason traditionally has been an amorphous 
and undisciplined inquiry. It is described in full in Justice 
Brandeis’ formulation from almost a hundred years ago: 
[T]he court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the 
business to which the restraint is applied; its conditions before and 
after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its 
effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil 
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the 
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is 
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable 
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help 
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.45 
With its extensive requirements for economic proof and its 
open-ended nature, the rule of reason is not for the faint of 
heart, nor for ordinary mortals who lack deep pockets. In fact, 
the rule of reason has been described by courts and 
commentators as complex and burdensome on litigants and on 
the judicial system.46 Moreover, a plaintiff abandoned to the 
mercy of the rule of reason will almost certainly lose.47 
                                                          
 45. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 46. See, e.g., Cont’l T. V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 
(1977) (noting that per se rules are used to avoid the complexity of rule-of-
reason trials); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609–10 (1972) 
(noting that the “inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction of 
competition in one sector of the economy against promotion of competition in 
another sector is one important reason we have formulated per se rules”); N. 
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (expressing frustration that 
the rule of reason inquiry is “often wholly fruitless when undertaken”); 
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In a 1999 article entitled Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 
I suggested the development of a “structured rule of reason.”48 
Since then, the notion of a structured rule of reason has 
appeared in scattered academic commentary and occasional 
court opinions.49 
In particular, the Supreme Court hinted at the idea of 
structuring the rule of reason in the 2007 Leegin case.50 In 
                                                          
Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, supra note 7, at 2106–12 
(contrasting the rule of reason with per se and other intermediary inquiries 
and describing the burdensome nature of the rule of reason); Nicole McGuire, 
An Antitrust Narcotic: How the Rule of Reason Is Lulling Vertical Enforcement 
to Sleep, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1225, 1247–51 (2012) (noting criticisms of the 
rule of reason in the context of evaluating vertical restraints); Maurice E. 
Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1375, 1490 (2009) (noting that the rule of reason is expensive and its 
outcomes unpredictable and that it is deficient under rule of law principles of 
nonarbitrariness, and general applicability); see also Robert Pitofsky, 
Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 830 n.42 (1987) (citing 
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), in which the Court 
refused to apply the rule of reason because of the practical difficulties of the 
minute inquiry into economic organization required); cf. Jefferson Parish 
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 34 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(comparing rule of reason to the peculiar form of per se rule applied in tying 
cases and describing both as requiring extensive and time-consuming 
economic analysis). 
 47. Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 
21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 830 (2009). 
 48. Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, supra note 7, at 2112–13 
(1999) (suggesting that for defensive leveraging cases involving tying, 
plaintiffs should be required to make the following four-part showing: 
(1) [T]he defendant has market power in the tying product; (2) the 
defendant has engaged in tying; (3) the behavior eliminates rivals in 
the second market; and (4) the elimination of rivals protects the 
original monopoly. Plaintiffs could satisfy the fourth part of the test 
by showing either that the second market presents a direct threat to 
the primary monopoly or that the second market is a way station 
likely to significantly ease entry into the primary market. 
Id. at 2113 (citations omitted)). 
 49. See 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
§ 1633, at 385–86 (3d ed. 2010) (presenting a formulation of a particular 
structured rule of reason); Stucke, supra note 46, at 1384 (noting that a 
structured version of the rule of reason exists in some lower courts); Christine 
A. Varney, A Post-Leegin Approach to Resale Price Maintenance Using a 
Structured Rule of Reason, 24 ANTITRUST, Fall 2009, at 22 (advocating for a 
structured rule of reason in certain cases); cf. Feldman, Defensive Leveraging 
in Antitrust, supra note 7, at 2109–12 (describing the per se rule in tying 
cases, which falls somewhere between the requirements of the rule of reason 
and the requirements of per se rules in non-tying cases). 
 50. Leegin Creative Leather Prods, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 
(2007). 
74 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:1 
 
Leegin, the Court abandoned per se treatment for vertical price 
restraints, but offered a glimmer of potential for a more 
workable rule of reason with the following language: “As courts 
gain experience considering the effects of these restraints by 
applying the rule of reason over the course of decisions, they 
can establish the litigation structure to ensure the rule 
operates to eliminate anticompetitive restraints from the 
market and to provide more guidance to businesses.”51 
In Actavis, once again, the Court has signaled its interest 
by noting, somewhat enigmatically, that structuring could be 
developed for the rule of reason.52 In typical fashion, however, 
the Court did not specify how the rule of reason inquiry might 
be structured, leaving it to the lower courts to develop, test, 
and sort out approaches. 
As in other areas of law, trial courts can structure antitrust 
litigation so as to avoid, on the one hand, the use of antitrust 
theories too abbreviated to permit proper analysis, and, on the 
other, consideration of every possible fact or theory irrespective of 
the minimal light it may shed on the basic question—that of the 
presence of significant unjustified anticompetitive consequences. We 
therefore leave to the lower courts the structuring of the present 
rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.53 
Any structuring, of course, will have to steer clear of the 
so-called “quick look” test, relief that the government prayed 
for in this case but was denied by the Court.54 As described by 
the Court, the quick look test would have shifted the burden to 
the defense to show pro-competitive effects in the event of 
reverse payments of the type described in the case.55 Despite 
the government’s plea, the Court soundly rejected that option, 
and courts and commentators would be wise to avoid 
structuring that appears to resurrect the quick look test.56 
One model for a potential structuring of the rule of reason 
can be found in the seminal antitrust treatise by Professor 
Hovenkamp.57 In the context of resale price maintenance, 
Professor Hovenkamp suggests structuring the rule of reason 
inquiry by allowing plaintiffs to establish their case through 
                                                          
 51. Id. at 898. 
 52. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013). 
 53. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 54. Id. at 2237. 
 55. Id. (citing Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 775 n.12 (1999)). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 49, §1633. 
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proving one of a series of factors dealing with market 
concentration, how widespread the restraints are in the 
industry, market power, geographic area, or need for 
promotional efforts.58 
Resale price maintenance concerns agreements between 
manufacturers and distributers regarding constraints on the 
price at which the product must be sold to the distributer’s 
customers. The factors appropriate for a resale price 
maintenance inquiry would not be appropriate for the complex, 
patent-laden inquiry necessary to evaluate a Hatch-Waxman 
settlement. The general approach is instructive, nevertheless. 
By identifying factors that plaintiffs could choose among to 
establish anticompetitive behavior and ones that defendants 
could choose among to show procompetitive effects for 
particular kinds of cases, one could develop a rational process 
for identifying and curbing anticompetitive behavior—not to 
mention signaling companies about where the line falls. In fact, 
a good place to begin could be the Supreme Court opinion in 
Actavis itself. There, the Court identified five sets of important 
considerations, including the following: 1) the restraint has the 
potential for genuine adverse effects; 2) the anticompetitive 
consequences will sometimes prove unjustified; 3) the patent 
holder likely has the power to bring about that harm in 
practice; 4) an antitrust action is feasible administratively; and 
5) other settlement options are available.59 Although the 
considerations were designed to explain why the FTC should be 
given the opportunity to present its antitrust case, rather than 
proving the antitrust case itself, and corresponding categories 
of proof to support even those considerations would have to be 
developed, the five considerations could offer a clue to the type 
of structured inquiry the Court would find acceptable in a rule 
of reason inquiry for reverse payment settlements. 
In short, the current all-or-nothing approach—per se you 
are dead, rule of reason you go free—is less than satisfying 
from either an intellectual or an operational perspective. Most 
important, none of this activity—neither the Federal Trade 
Commission’s effort in bringing the Actavis case nor the 
Supreme Court’s effort in opening the door to examining 
reverse payments—is worth a candle unless the courts actually 
                                                          
 58. Id. §1633, at 385–86. 
 59. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2226 (2013). 
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develop a model for a successful demonstration under the rule 
of reason. 
Although the Court has opened the door ever so slightly, 
one should not lose sight of the opportunity offered. It will 
become increasingly important to flesh out the rule of reason as 
competition authorities look more closely at behavior involving 
patents. Whether that behavior is in the context of Hatch-
Waxman litigation, patent trolling, or other circumstances, we 
must be able to separate use of the intellectual property right 
from use of the intellectual property system—as well as to 
identify when the intellectual property system is being used in 
an anticompetitive manner. 
Most important, society cannot simply turn away 
whenever the word “patent” is uttered. Such patent 
exceptionalism flows from misconceptions about both the 
patent system itself and the policy implications embedded in its 
design. This misguided homage to a deity that does not exist 
undermines the functioning of both the patent system and 
antitrust law. 
